transformation—and thus, at the same time, of the greatly differing phenomena of rendering and translation—could not possibly be more intimate. The current dissolution of world order finds in the global consciousness of world literature(s) many answers that depict not simple recipes, but rather Means of Living and Means of Survival, to such an extent that they may be understood as imaginative testing grounds of things to come. Always necessary to a new understanding, however, are concepts to render somehow visible that which, though not to be overlooked, is often missed.

What is Globalization?

This work proceeds from the thesis that globalization is not a recent phenomenon, but a long-abiding process extending over several centuries, a process that may be divided into four phases of accelerated globalization, and which ties the early modern era of European historical writing, across the world-wide, variously diverging modern eras, to our present day in the first decades of the 21st century. The differentiation, necessary in light of a number of complex and often contradictory developments, between different phases of acceleration should at the same time avoid either dehistoricizing the current phase of globalization, or separating from it a sort of “prehistory”—as does, for instance, Ulfried Reichardt—which is seen to begin with 1492, which “coincided with European expansion,” and finally “ended at the beginning of the 20th century.” All of these phases of acceleration possess their individual centers and courses of progression, legitimation strategies and global historical consequences, without the understanding of which the following phases of accelerated globalization cannot be adequately understood. In order to grasp the current phase of accelerated globalization, not only historical, but also cultural depth of field is indispensable.

That the concept of “globalization” is of more recent coinage and was able to gain prominence only over the course of the nineties in the previous century


18 Ulfried Reichardt, Globalisierung, p. 29.
is an indisputable fact. Nevertheless, after the turn of the millennium, the emerging insight (that had begun with Alexander von Humboldt, probably the first globalization theorist) that processes of globalization may only be adequately comprehended from a long-term perspective caught on in the cultural sciences. Additionally, each one of the principal phases possesses specific aspects that separate it from earlier or later phases of globalization and make it unmistakable. And yet we will only adequately understand the current fourth phase—and with it, the dissolution of world order, as it is called by Amin Maalouf—when we succeed in comprehending the previous phases in their continuity as well as in their differences. For even still, the present surge in globalization follows, in many respects, the trailblazing and vectorizations that introduced a decisive change of epoch at the end of the 15th century.

The fact that the trailblazing traced here was shaped essentially from out of Europe does not mean that a Eurocentric explanatory model is to be presented in this work. Certainly there were, at the time of the first phase of accelerated globalization, systems of power and cultures—like the Tawantinsuyu of the Incas in the Andean region, or the Aztec Empire in the North American, for instance—that were in a state of rapid expansion when the first Spanish caravels appeared on the horizon. Yet these expansions, which were not taking place on a global scale, were caught in the undertow and the whirlpool of a world-wide Iberian expansion of power which knew, in the awareness of these Incan or Aztec conquests and their local restriction to single areas, how to serve itself in gaining the ability to attain its goals of power acquisition more effectively and more quickly.

These complex military, social, and economical processes will be illuminated in this volume from various geographical viewpoints and cultural perspectives. Through this multi-perspective view, the central role of the so-called “Old World,” which drove the surges in globalization that came from, and were primarily shaped by, Europe, will become more clearly recognizable, and should not disintegrate in an all-relativizing image of history, even if Europe’s culpability and its accompanying responsibility for a process de longue durée spanning centuries (and which has by no means reached its close) be relativized in those cases where it is necessary to elaborate and cast light on the brutality as well as
the long-term consequences of these actions. For, though it is recast in greatly differing cultural configurations and economic formats, the Conquista goes on.

**Phases of Acceleration**

**One**

Standing at the beginning of the string of events that without a doubt decidedly shaped and programmed the early modern era, the *first phase of accelerated globalization is the colonial expansion of Europe, which—driven by developments in the entire Mediterranean region—was carried out substantially by the Iberian powers of Spain and Portugal. Even though the venture of Christopher Columbus was based, as is well-known, upon partially erroneous and excessively optimistic suppositions and calculations to the extent that the Genoese explorer’s ships, which had long since passed the point of no return, were only saved from sinking with all hands to the bottom of the sea by the fact of the American continent lying across their route at the midway point, this enterprise to reach the East by navigating westward across the sea was still tremendously influential to subsequent history. And this is not only because the route by land, which was controlled largely by Arab powers, was circumvented and direct trade relations could be established with the spice islands and the great Asian empires to the east of Europe, but even more because the rival Iberian kingdoms in the western part of the European continent, with the active abettal of the Pope (most recently with the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494), were dividing the world among themselves and pursuing in its truest sense an expansionist Weltpolitik from Europe outward.

Thus do the caravels of Columbus lead to a powerfully and equally reckless executed Weltpolitik that, for the first time, was conceived on a truly planetary scale. After the conquest of the Nasrid kingdom of Granada, which was the last remaining Arab-dominated region in the Iberian territory, Spain, having been unified under the Catholic Monarchs only shortly before, now directed the motion of the Reconquista no longer to the south, into North Africa, but instead threw all available forces at the new conquest, the Conquista of those immense territories to be torn quickly away from the numerous indigenous cultures far

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outside of the realm of influence of the Aztecs or Incas. Spain and Portugal both were working under great pressure to build up and expand empires of dimensions that spanned the globe.

With the so-called discovery of the “New World” by the Europeans, there followed by the middle of the 16th century an enormous expansion of European dominance which was by no means restricted to America, and within which the astonishingly quickly built colonial institutions, mechanisms of power, and structures for disseminating information created trade connections that for the first time could be reasonably described as global. The emblematic globalizing means of transport for this period was the caravel, which embodied the state-of-the-art in advanced European shipping technology.

Beside the impact of this immensely accelerating process of expansion, accompanied as it was by genocides and massacres, all preceding expansions of powers both within and beyond Europe appear to be but a prologue, falling far short of the dimensions of a truly world-wide movement. In light of this tremendously multiform process, it appears from today’s perspective to be quite self-evident that the hazardous venture of a circumnavigation led by Magellan or Elcano—even in the face of enormous losses—must succeed. The dimensions of the Earth were now empirically known to the people of the Occident, the Earth in her spherical shape now potentially conquerable.

In short order, Europe came into possession of enormous riches—start-up capital for a new age which for centuries would stand as the “modern era,” essentially as a sign of this colonial power structure that was neither consistent in its progress nor controlled by the same central power. The power structures and asymmetries between “civilized” and “wild,” between “Christian” and “Heathen,” between the “West” and the “Rest,” in which, for a long time, Europe dealt with the “Problem of the Other” (and not only discursively) seemed thus to be established once and for all. The age of that which one could designate in a

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truly globally “rounded” sense as world economy had begun—even before the Iberian circle around the planet could finally be closed with the conquest of the Philippines and their inclusion in the colonial economy controlled by Spain. The initial power-positioning of a world increasingly dominated and shaped by Europe dates from this time.

The asymmetry in European/non-European connections that comes to expression in this first phase of accelerated globalization became the point of origin for subsequent phases of accelerated globalization and influenced the structural formation of asymmetric relations in the military, economic, political, technological, and cultural fields all the way to the present day. Consistent with this phase, too, are the extremely one-sidedly moving paths for the transfer of knowledge regarding the “New World,” as they are reflected in not only the logbook of Columbus, but even more in the letters and chronicles of Spanish or other European conquerors and historians of the 16th century, and even in the reports, investigations, and speculations of many missionaries. The names of such diverse figures as Hernán Cortés and Bernal Díaz del Castillo, Francisco López de Gómara and Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, Garcilaso de la Vega el Inca und José de Acosta, Bartolomé de las Casas, and Bernardino de Sahagún stand as representatives of a transfer process of that begins to cause knowledge of the New World to accumulate in the Old and to be used for the development of connections for global domination and exchange. Processes of globalization always presuppose not only new norms of configuration, but new forms of the circulation of knowledge as well.

In the first phase of accelerated globalization, archipelagic and transarchipelagic connections take on a tremendous significance. For the history of dis-
covery, and for that of conquest as well, the Canary Islands, Cape Verde, the Azores, and Madeira were of decided importance on the Old World side, while the Island World of the Caribbean—as will be shown in all clarity by the world map of Juan de la Cosa from the year 1500, which is to be discussed more extensively in the first part of this volume—likewise became the beachhead for the conquest of the entire continent. Deploying from the secure bases of these islands, strongholds on the continent were established so that the dominance of the Iberian interlopers over vast areas of land was organized and enforced from within the insular structures of the cities: an island strategy that differed fundamentally from the territorial or continental course of action involving an advancing frontier, as it would later come to be so successfully applied on the North American continent.  

The first phase of accelerated globalization already begins to distinguish itself by the fact that, especially within the realm of Spanish influence, the deliberated language policy for a rising empire was adjusted to be extremely goal-oriented. Altogether, three European languages were globalized and established as world languages in this fashion: Spanish, Portuguese, and Latin (about which, in terms of its presence in the process of conquest and administration, and in the transatlantic circulation of knowledge as well, there continues to be a distinct paucity of research).

Along with processes of globalization there are always accompanying globalization fears that tend to express themselves in catastrophic contexts. The Europeans dragged into the “New World” a multitude of “new” diseases that, once there—and in part deliberately introduced by the Spanish conquistadors through the distribution of infected objects—considerably hastened the process of conquest, insofar as the indigenous populations’ capacity to mount resistance was, at least in part, substantially weakened. Conversely, the conquerors also infected themselves with sicknesses hitherto unknown to them, whereupon the Iberian soldiers, who were stationed not only on the American continent, but in a wide variety of places in Europe, Africa, and Asia, quickly spread these sicknesses.

Syphilis came to be the defining epidemic of the first phase of globalization, which soon appeared not only in Spain and Italy, but in various parts of North Africa as well, as we know, for instance, from the reports of Giovanni Leone |

l’Africano, who will be discussed later. The intensified emergence of plagues and epidemics consistently accompanies such accelerated phases that drive the process of mondialisation onward. In his cultural history of plagues, Stefan Winkle very concisely asserts from a viewpoint of medical history:

When, on the 15th of March, 1493, the returning fleet of Columbus—after the loss of one ship—arrived at Palos, their port of departure on the southern coast of Spain, they brought back with them, along with the account of the New Continent, as a special “gift,” a heretofore unknown, sexually transmitted disease: syphilis. Departing Palos, they next sailed to nearby Seville, where they remained for four weeks. There, the sex-starved crew must have heavily frequented the bordello, infecting the working girls with the hitherto completely unknown disease. The same happened in Barcelona, whither Columbus traveled with his two ships by the water route, without touching upon the remainder of Spain.29

The word “touching” may here be interpreted quite literally. And incredibly quickly, the consequences were observable, as an eyewitness active at that time in Barcelona, the physician Ruy Díaz de Isla, would subsequently assert in document that appeared in 1539: “It pleased divine justice to send to us a previously unknown sickness which appeared in the city of Barcelona in 1493. This city was infected first, then all of Europe, and then the entire inhabited world.”30 Within a few years, affiliated Spanish task forces and administrations had indeed established a network of calamity between America, Asia, and Africa.31

The syphilis plague remains fascinating today, not only because historians can turn here to an epidemic of which, for the first time in history, its beginning and its subsequent course are well-documented.32 The actual basis for this disease’s enduring power to fascinate lies much more likely in the fact that—as Albrecht Dürer’s illustration from 1496 shows (Fig. 1)—it is inseparably connected with an (n.b., occidentally) imagined notion of the global. In this first depiction of a person suffering from syphilis, the year 1494, which the great German artist clearly inscribed within the floating celestial orb over the mercenary’s33 head, together with a text in Latin that frames the early woodcut, shows how events

30 Quoted in ibid. p. 542. On the spread of the sickness, see pp. 541–575. A print of one of the first broadsheets from the year 1496 appears on p. 566.
32 Ibid. p. 123.
on a global scale were occurring thick and fast, and how rapidly the contagion—
with which Dürer himself may have been afflicted but a few years later—
spread throughout the Old World. Also, this work of art, in the tradition of the
Pestblatt ("plague print") as they were called, captures this fact: that the con-
temporary reactions to syphilis would decisively shape all later types of reaction
to global epidemics, even up to our present day, which is again much influ-
enced by accelerating globalization. The image of the physically suffering man,
covered in pustules as he makes his way through the world, imparts to us in an
artistically concentrated manner what the carrying of foreign plagues and epi-
demics, always “from outside,” means to the landscapes, with their church
towers and houses, that lie so quietly there: nothing less than the forfeit of the
isolation and the assumed tranquility of the local under the influence of the
global. In globalization, fear always resonates before it.

Fig. 1: Albrecht Dürer: *Der Syphilitiker (Syphilitic Man)* (1496), colored woodcut. © Albertina, Vienna, Graphische Sammlung.
A second phase of accelerated globalization extends from the middle of the 18th century to the beginning of the 19th, and is modeled perhaps most clearly by the voyages of Bougainville, Cook, or Lapérouse. In the names of these great French and British seafarers, the voyages of discovery of earlier expansion are connected in an exemplary way with the forward-looking form of the exploratory voyage, precisely as it was epitomized by James Cook. By the end of this period, the largest of the “white patches” on the map of our planet have been eliminated. The contemporarily observable changing of utopias to uchronias—that is, the replacement of projections onto another place by projections into another time—provides important evidence, in a wide variety of literatures, that the upswing of that territorializing genre that accompanied the first phase of accelerated globalization (and for which Thomas More’s 1516 text *Utopia* may be viewed as paradigmatic) now began to be replaced, in the last third of the 18th century, by new strategies of temporalization.

This second phase is no longer determined by the Iberian powers, whose colonial empires are being subjected to numerous reforms, but by France and England, as they, especially, are the ascending colonial powers. These two leading European powers, which, like their predecessors, arise from the western part of the European continent, face off outside of Europe on the various seas of the world in rancorous opposition as competitors. It may be said that the emblematic mode of transport for this phase of accelerated globalization, for both England and France, is the frigate.

The evolution of both the British and French trade systems in part reaches back to already existing regional and supra-regional trade connections to non-European powers and peoples, which are successively integrated into an ever more complex world-wide trade system that is increasingly controlled from London and Paris. Lisbon, Madrid and its Spanish foreign ports, and Amsterdam as well (whose ascent occurred during an intermediate period that shares many characteristics of the first phase, but at the same time, in the economic sector, predates the developments of the second), are noticeably curtailed in their range of operation. As in the first phase of accelerated globalization, the European capitals from which these world-wide processes of expansion are steered during the second phase lie in close geographical proximity to one another.

The reports of the voyages of discovery and research in the second half of the 18th century especially, with their forms of preparation and composition in line with the specific interests of European dominance and scientific progress, document in a manner that remains impressive even today an upsurge in
streams of knowledge that not only globally multiplied the Eurocentric paths of knowledge, but also led to profound epistemological changes in the universalistic thinking of the occidental sciences. The tremendous quantity of new knowledge that needed not only to be accrued but also to be newly configured forced this asymmetrically constructed system of circulating knowledge, based on the needs of Europe, to create those temporalization structures that have been impressively elucidated in the works of Michel Foucault  and Wolf Lepenies, and which comprised the most diverse and differentiating disciplines and realms of both science and knowledge. The transfer of knowledge subsequently led to the transformation of all knowledge configuration. The end of natural history is characterized by this temporalization every bit as much as the end of a way of thinking in which—as Reinhart Koselleck effectively showed—the Historia could still be the Magistra Vitae.

In front of this backdrop of an emerging historical understanding that is also open to the future, it appears to me to be necessary and unavoidable that I include among the highly significant phenomena in this second phase of accelerated globalization not only the European double-revolution of the 18th century—the Industrial Revolution coming from England, and the political revolution that comes to its actual “universalistic” expression in France in 1789—but also the double-revolution outside of Europe—that for the independence of the United States of America, directed against British colonialism and achieved in 1776, and the Haitian Revolution, which rises up against French colonialism, and above all against the transatlantic slave-trade of the “Black Atlantic,” and aims for the goal of independence in 1804. Indeed, the sometimes conscious and sometimes unconscious excision of this slave revolution of Saint-Domingue

(i.e., Haiti), the first ever to lead successfully to the founding of a state, from a "general" revolution theory has contributed on one hand to "Europizing" revolution theory, and on the other hand to deliberately overlooking the fundamental relationship of the revolutions that do receive mention to the second phase of accelerated globalization. To oppose this, it is necessary to keep the European and the American double-revolutions equally in view, and to render them to like degrees epistemologically useful.

Without enormous advances in nautical, transport, and communications technology, the great sea voyages of the second half of the 18th century, on those frigates whose names have been burned into the collective memory of the nations of Europe, would certainly not have been possible. These travels were not primarily aimed at the interiors of continents, but were interested in coastlines, straits, possible passages, and the structures of archipelagos, all of which might prove useful to faster and safer transatlantic or transpacific shipping lanes. Just looking at the Pacific, the largest ocean surface on our planet, archipelagic and transarchipelagic structures played (and play) a vital role. The strategic aspect of Island Worlds, so important both to military control and to trade, was of equally decisive relevance to the Pacific and Atlantic Island Worlds, and to the transport routes in the Indian Ocean as well. Thus, for example, did the islands of Saint-Domingue, Tahiti, or Mauritius play a role within the French colonial system that is difficult to overstate.

The fact that the acceleration and intensification of world-wide connections changed living conditions in places beyond the realms of French and English influence can be demonstrated by the fact that most German Welt-compounds in use even today—such as Welthandel, Weltverkehr, Weltbürgertum, or Weltfrieden


(world trade, world traffic, world citizenship, or world peace), but also **Weltbewuβtsein**, **Weltwirtschaft**, or **Weltliteratur** (world consciousness, world economy, or world literature)—may be assigned to the second phase of accelerated globalization. These compounds and neologisms reveal a changed thought-horizon which—self-evident to Europe—in a virtually encyclopedic manner took possession of a world as it was delineated by the clearly most successful colonial encyclopedia, Guillaume-Thomas Raynal’s *Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des européens dans les deux Indes*, which was first published, anonymously, in 1770.\(^4^3\)

In these volumes (which harken back substantially to the impulses of Raynal and Denis Diderot), and also in many works of other contemporary European forerunners of a global history, such as Cornelius de Pauw, William Robertson, Juan Bautista Muñoz, or Alexander von Humboldt, there are numerous references to plagues and epidemics, especially the dreaded yellow fever. This fact gives credence to the idea that in this phase too, the phenomena of globalization would be connected to the experience of catastrophic sickness. The yellow fever (*Gelbfieber, vomito negro*), which had already spread like plague during the first phase of accelerated globalization, especially in the Caribbean,\(^4^4\) experienced a significantly accelerated proliferation, to such an extent that on board British warships there were soon measures implemented, about which a British naval officer in 1761 would report:

> The cannon ports are opened daily. In dry weather, the lower deck is swept and scrubbed, in wet conditions, however, it is dry-scraped, so that the timbers where the hammocks hang do not mold. Dry wood is burned there, and resin is thrown upon it, from which smoke not only are the insects killed, but the bad vapors too are driven out.\(^4^5\)

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\(^4^5\) Ibid. p. 978 f.
All over the world, fear of the yellow fever was enormous, and even in provincial Berlin it excited a powerful public interest that Heinrich von Kleist himself—who for good reasons of his own dealt with the especially frightening sickness in another context⁴⁶—sought to exploit for the distribution of his *Berliner Abendblätter* in 1810. This appears on the 5th of December, 1810:

> From Swiss news come reports that in Cuba, the yellow fever “is strongly raging.” From Copenhagen, the strictest measures have been announced by the Royal Department of Quarantine “in response to the infectious sickness dominating in several areas around the globe... The decree that has been issued in response to this situation sets forth that the contagion that broke out in Otranto and Brindisi is a blister-like sickness, while the one dominating in the Spanish seaports of Malaga and Cartagena, on the other hand, appears to be yellow fever.”⁴⁷

The measures immediately following newsflashes of this sort, taken not only on board warships, but in both the colonies and in the mother countries as well, prove how great the degree of global networking and the world consciousness that it actu-ated had already become during this second phase of accelerated globalization. It is not by mere chance that, just at the time of the second surge in globalization, repeated waves of yellow fever would spread, leading finally to the first documented cases in Africa in 1768.⁴⁸

Governmental authorities, however, did not always react quickly enough. Thus, the ramifications of the reports of Alexander von Humboldt, who had decisively shaped the concept of world consciousness, were recognized with insuffi-cient decisiveness over the remaining course of the 19th century.⁴⁹ During his journey, Humboldt himself was affected by a yellow fever epidemic which, since the end of the 18th century, had demonstrably spread from the Caribbean all the way to the Mediterranean region. This experience, which necessitated a fundamental change in the course of his American research expedition, demonstrated to him with ample clarity how fragile those transoceanic connections with which he had first become familiar during his crossing from Spain to the Carib-

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⁴⁷ As quoted in Stefan Winkle: *Geiseln der Menschheit*, p. 985. This work presents a comprehensive collocation of the notices from 1810 as collected by Kleist.
bean on the frigate Pizarro still were. And time and again during his journey, he was able to perceive how much the Spanish ships, once so proud, now depended upon the ubiquity of British naval power. It was the British who had long since won out in the race of the European powers for the dominance of the world’s oceans, thanks to the overwhelming power of their fleet.

Three

In the course of the third phase of accelerated globalization (during the period of the last third of the 19th and the first decade of the 20th centuries), for the first time, there appeared with the European powers a non-European power—though culturally, politically, and economically shaped by occidental influences—that had just rid itself during the previous phase of its colonial dependency: the United States of America. This third phase stands within the influence of globally enacted neocolonial distribution struggles and processes of dependent and unequal modernization that to differing degrees reshaped the most disparate regions of the planet. During this period, divergent concepts and processes of modernization that no longer allow speaking of the modern era in the singular arise on a global scale.

It follows then, that this third phase is not the product of one unfinished project of the modern era, nor of the unfinished project of a different modern era, but rather, of a plenitude of realizations of various modern-era projects which sought to make themselves heard not only in the political and economic realms, but in the cultural as well—as perhaps in Latin America with the Hispanoamerican Modernismo, and later with the Brazilian Modernismo of the avant-gardists. But without question, the formative socioeconomic context for these developments of a self-multiplying modern era is shaped by that clearly accelerating surge in globalization between 1870 and 1914, during which one may, in light of the world-wide trade network, speak with certainty of a multilaterally modeled “closed system.”

53 Jürgen Osterhammel / Niels P. Petersson: Geschichte der Globalisierung, p. 66.
Even though modernists like the Cuban José Martí—who probably was the earliest to reflect the consequences of this third phase—or the Uruguayan José Enrique Rodó powerfully voiced the warning that it could happen, there quickly arose upon the American continent itself, within the context of the build-up of American sea power, the establishment of a continental dominance by the USA. This dominance, since the end of the 19th century, additionally led to an economic preponderance in favor of the US in the Caribbean and Latin America that has come to visible expression largely in the form of numerous military interventions.

The United States of America had not only freed themselves from the colonial sovereignty of Great Britain during the second phase, but had now made it possible, thanks to their technologically far-superior battle fleet, to assert their dominance over the leading power of the first phase. Thus, in 1898, the Spanish fleet with its squadrons outside of Santiago de Cuba and Manila was mercilessly and very quickly sunk by the armored cruisers of the USA, which had been but waiting for a propitious moment to intervene, under some pretense, in Cuba’s war of independence from Spain. At the same time, the transatlantic cables, in place since 1857, transformed the military conflict between Spain and the United States in the Caribbean and the Philippines into the first actually global media-war in world history, as the coverage of military actions in the media of the countries involved exerted immediate influence upon their strategic direction and respective waging of the war on-site.

The new and rapid communication capabilities, the modernized and vastly improved nautical and military technologies, as well as the newly developing areas of interest during the run-up to World War I in which Germany, too—following the failed attempts of Brandenburg in the last years of the 17th century—began seriously to strut about as a colonial power, led to a situation in which the construction and installation of transarchipelagic naval bases and transport opportunities rose to great military and economic significance. The US naval bases within the realm of influence of the new American hegemonic power gave rise to an island-supported structure capable of adding military pressure to the political and economic interests not only all over the continent, but in the Pacific sphere of influence as well. The steamship had long since advanced, in both its civil and military applications, to the status of the emblematic, globalizing means of transport.

In this third phase of accelerated globalization, no further language may be discerned which might have stepped up to join those European languages that were already globalized. All attempts to establish German, for example, in the overseas regions of Africa or Oceania that were dependent upon the still young,
but highly militarized empire, were doomed to failure, based as they were upon a dream of colonialism that was soon to vanish. While a certain global power-shift in favor of the English (and with it the Anglo-Saxon) culture can certainly be confirmed, against which people began, under the flags of Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism, and above all, Pan-Latinism, to protest vehemently, the previously undisputed position of dominance of the languages descending from Latin, that is, French, Spanish, and Portuguese, was progressively crumbling. But Pan-Latinism, which with the “invention” of Latin America\textsuperscript{54} around the middle of the 19th century sought to meet the encroachment of the Anglo-Saxon world with massive resistance, plunged, upon the defeats of the French leading power in the war with Prussia from 1870-1871 and of Spanish colonial power in 1898 at the hands of the USA, into a deep world-political crisis, the shadow of which would loom over the entire third phase.

With this phase of accelerated globalization, an increased incidence of pestilence and epidemics once more spread forth, in which above all should be mentioned the wave-like spread of smallpox. Lafcadio Hearn\textsuperscript{55} was born on the island of Lefkada, the son of a Greek mother and a British military doctor, and was raised and educated in Ireland and England and spent many years in the USA and the Caribbean, then lived out the rest of his life in Japan (and thus knew much of transarchipelagic relations). Hearn depicted in moving scenes with what disastrous effect (with which nothing in Europe or the US could compare) the smallpox could arise in the Caribbean Island World.\textsuperscript{56} These literarily challenging yet long-ignored scenes from the decade of the 1880s show just how fragile the dense net of shipping connections were, should the harbors, in response to rising pandemics, have to be closed for extended periods. These vario-


las, (petite vérole, smallpox, or simply “pox,”\textsuperscript{57}) were certainly known and feared during the first globalization phase; the “epidemiological storm”\textsuperscript{58} of the United States’ Civil War (1861-1865), however, once again elevated the complete destructive force of this sickness into (world-wide) consciousness.

Within the Spanish-speaking realm, authors like José Rizal—who grew up in the Philippines, then would later live in various countries in Europe, in the USA, Hong Kong, or Japan—or his equally well-traveled Nicaraguan fellow-writer Rubén Darío, answer the challenges of the surge in globalization, which they were able to observe first-hand, with original literary creations and with concepts of identity that connected differing cultures, facilitating their own way into the modern era. At the same time, correspondence activities such as, for example, the founding of journals by the Cuban José Martí give evidence of the aspiration to reverse the direction of the transfer of knowledge between the Old and New Worlds and to reshape upon a global level the paths of knowledge in the interest of a Latin America increasingly portrayed as “sick” and “rocked by crisis.”

For these authors, it becomes apparent beyond doubt on the horizon of the acceleration processes that they experienced and depicted, that in the near future the meridian of political power, but also that of artistic energy and potency, would leap from Europe over to America. It thus became necessary to take measures to show the way (of a new knowledge from new perspectives) to a new world order, one less influenced by asymmetrical conditions of independence.

Four

The current and as yet not concluded fourth phase of accelerated globalization that comprises the last two decades of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century as well as the first two of the 21\textsuperscript{st} will be characterized especially by the rapidly increasing globalization of the financial markets, the building of communications systems that span the globe “in real-time,” and the overcoming of a binary, ideologically motivated political bloc system. By no means does this indicate—as the once more intensifying and often religiously-clothed contrasts between the “Occident” and the “Orient” show in all clarity—that by virtue of this we might be standing directly before a breakthrough to a unified world society, or that the borders between

\textsuperscript{57} C.f. Stefan Winkle: Geisseln der Menschheit, p. 853. Regarding this first phase, see pp. 853–860.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid. p. 892. Statistical data on vaccination are also presented here.
states have become obsolete. For the number of states on our planet that have become independent is also consistently increasing.

Within the context of the new contrast (old there) between “The East” and “The West,” to what extent military actions will be increasingly carried out alongside these developments, and to what extent these actions, for their part, will be turned to the function of the “self-fulfilling prophecy” of Huntington’s famous thesis on the “Clash of Civilizations,” for the moment remains to be seen. In every case, the rapid development of computer-supported electronic data exchange systems, combined with their world-wide networking, allows mass-media communication in nearly real-time, which leads to a changed perception of global, political, or economic, but above all, of cultural phenomena and of the phenomena of everyday life. The popular reference to the “global village” admittedly applies only on quite specific (and in each case politically desired) levels. And like the caravel, frigate, and steam ship before it, the airplane, the earliest development of which takes place during the third globalization phase, and which in a real sense has become the emblematic means of transport in the fourth phase of accelerated globalization, is far from being at the disposal of all of the planet’s inhabitants.

The transformation in consciousness, which has been brought about by an explosion in the rapid circulation of people, goods, and ideas and accelerated by communications technology, and which one could fundamentally interpret in terms of a new world consciousness, is taking place within the framework of a virtual public view that is no longer held together only at select points, but is on a global scale, and within the aforementioned new concept of globalization, comes as the expression of a discursive “world socialization,” in which, however, the structural asymmetries of the previous phases of accelerated globalization may be traced to the present day. The phenomena of the current phase will only be understandable to those who are capable of grasping the pathways and histories of the earlier globalization phases, such that the globalizations structurally emerge within the context of globalization. In the realm of literature, corresponding to these phenomena, there is a development that is gaining in intensity of literatures without a fixed abode, the expansion of which I have examined at length in another work.

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60 See also Mathias Albert: Zur Politik der Weltgesellschaft. Identität und Recht im Kontext internationaler Vergesellschaftung.
The new communications and data storage technologies—as the development of the internet and GPS can easily show—are of course closely coupled to military necessities and strategies. Island technologies toward the military dominance of entire continents have been further improved to such an extent that mobile “islands” have been created in the form of missile-equipped submarines and aircraft carriers, from which enormous territories may be controlled, threatened, or “bombed back” several decades. In the image of the aircraft carrier, where the steam ship of the third phase of accelerated globalization and the airplane of the fourth intersect, the island strategy of the current state of technological development may be most impressively presented in stark historical clarity.

![2010: A global view of HIV infection](image)

**Fig. 2:** WHO: *HIV Prevalence Map 2009*. UNAIDS Report on the Global Aids Epidemic. Source: [www.unaids.org](http://www.unaids.org).

On the level of plagues and epidemics as well, threats analogous to the globalization fears of the earlier phases have arisen, manifested especially in the forms of AIDS, the Ebola virus, or a wide variety of pandemics. On June 5, 1981, in the

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bulletin of the US Centers for Disease Control *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report*, there first appeared an article on the illness of five homosexual men in Los Angeles; there soon followed further reports from other regions. By 1985 at the latest, the actual extent of the catastrophe could not be overlooked; the public appeal of a doctor in the US, for instance, put it this way: “Every time we learn something new about this virus or the course of the illness, it adds a new dimension to our worst fears.” The *Global Report of 2010* also soberly states that as of the end of 2009, some 33.3 million people worldwide were infected with HIV—a rate of increase of 27%, compared to the number from 1999, when the working figure stood at 26.2 million infected. The visualization of this development on the world map of the WHO (Fig. 2) clearly shows that AIDS—like syphilis, yellow fever, and smallpox before it—fosters an experience of global connections, the intensity of which in no way falls short of the perception of comfortable, “positive” aspects of globalization. Crucial to the matter is this: the substantially faster and “direct-to-destination” possibilities of transcontinental transport afforded by the airplane can spread the virus in question world-wide within a few hours, whereby the afflicted regions can now no longer be delimited to the outer boundaries (in the form of harbors or border towns), but from the very beginning can also include the central regions of the interior.

Decentralized, rhizomatically structured communications networks make it possible—as may be seen in the most recent developments in many Arab countries—to set autocratic ruling structures wobbling, but can, by sufficiently prepared mechanisms of suppression—as in the case of China—be impeded, paralyzed, and deactivated.

The protagonists of this fourth phase of accelerated globalization are undoubtedly the US and (with a currently weakening trend) the island-state of Japan, but also, once again, Europe. One may well be surprised, along with Jürgen Habermas, that Europe should again find itself among the leading powers of globalization, if indeed world history has always offered the great empires but a single chance, as is true “for the empires of the Old World as well as the modern

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63 Ibid. p. 612.
states—for Portugal, Spain, England, France, and Russia.” But this second chance has now been extended to Europe as a whole, albeit under the condition that this chance be used “not in the style of its old power-politics” but only under the “premise of a non-imperialistic understanding” and toward “the learning of others.”

Amin Maalouf would undoubtedly agree with this analysis by Jürgen Habermas, if, for him, the history of the European Union avouches hope for the concrete and realistic possibility of being able in the long term to overcome centuries-old enmities and warlike contentions. Whether the European Union has consistently been in the position, during the current phase of globalization, to renounce old imperial power mechanisms on the level of world policy will certainly be judged in widely varying ways. At the same time, however, one can perceive in the EU the attempt to establish a new and stable framework of conditions for the development of a ZusammenLebensWissen, a “knowledge for living together,” that by no means may be allowed to remain restricted to the territory of the states of the Union. To this end, Amin Maalouf has formulated, from the field of literature and, furthermore, from a position that at the same time combines an inner and an outer perspective, important guidelines for future, more far-sighted policies for coexistence.

After this initial outline (necessarily compact and to be considerably expanded in subsequent chapters) of four phases of accelerated globalization, the conviction becomes evident to me that, without knowledge of the first phase, one cannot understand those historical, political, economic, and cultural changes, nor the changes within the history of developing mentalities, which in the various traditions of historical science in Europe tend to be designated either as Neuzeit, “modern times,” or les temps modernes. The second phase of accelerated globalization may, in turn, be viewed as one of the immediate prerequisites for the (occidental) modern era, the temporalization structures and altered epistemological foundations of which become manifest in the last quarter of the 18th century, especially in the wake of the US American, the French, and the Haitian revolutions—among which this last-mentioned was, admittedly, universally viewed by contemporaries as a paradigm quickly to be suppressed again. Phases of accelerated globalization are phases of historical and cultural compression in which long-term strands of tradition meet with trends in a direct interrelation,

66 Ibid.
whereby the questions of multi-, inter-, and transcultural relations take on a vital, if often underestimated, significance.

This also applies, of course, to other configurations between different surges in globalization. The opening of the occidental modern era onto a common space open to the future, a space with which the internet age became both technologically and culturally configured during the last two decades of the 20th century, is, here again, not to be comprehensively understood without consideration of those processes designated as the third phase of accelerated globalization, especially the process leading to the development of divergent modernities. Along with globalization “from above” (especially of financial markets and capital), there appear a globalization “from below” (on the level of mass migrations and their attendant fundamental globalization critique) and even a “transverse” globalization (on the level of an information and knowledge society that is interconnected on a world-wide scale, the centers of which—let us not deceive ourselves—lie nonetheless in the USA and, to some extent, in Europe). Within the parameters of this fourth phase, China, India, and perhaps Brazil have become global players that in the future will have an important say not only in political and social matters, but in the realms of economics and culture as well. Indeed, China might currently find itself in a position that could be compared in many respects to that of the USA within the time frame of the third phase. That the next surge in globalization, which might still be expected to occur in the 21st century, should necessarily benefit English alone is, in light of the growing importance of Asian markets and powers, hardly likely.

The characteristics of the current phase of accelerated globalization are undoubtedly quite specific; yet they are no more specific than those of the past phases, nor are they independent of them. Only when it is understood that the present globalization is not something completely new, a creatio ex nihilo, will we be able to draw forth the lessons of the preceding phases of this process. Only then is it possible for one to respond to the trailblazing and vectorizations observable since the expansion of Europe at the close of the 15th century with new paths and new forms of knowledge that take the place of the dissolution of world order currently being articulated, and which could develop such models and measures as are indispensable to a peaceful coexistence in diversity. In the search for these new paths, for this other knowledge, the literatures of the world—and it is from here that this work proceeds—are of inestimable value. For their knowledge is a knowledge that is not limited to particular regions of nations, but quite clearly strides beyond individual cultural areas and is constantly on the move.